光华讲坛——教授论坛第 105 期

主题： Dismembered Giants: Bank Divestitures and Local Lending（解体的巨人：银行资产剥离与本地贷款）

主讲人：金融研究院 Yong  Kyu Gam副教授

主持人：经济与管理研究院  吴季副教授

时间：2019年11月12日（周二）上午10:00—11:30

地点：西南财经大学柳林校区格致楼1211

主办单位：经济与管理研究院  科研处

主讲人简介：

Yong Kyu Gam博士2017年加入西南财经大学金融研究院。他于华盛顿大学圣路易斯获得金融学博士学位。他的研究领域为金融中介（financial intermediation）和公司金融（corporate finance），特别关注于金融稳定和信贷市场问题。他的研究多次在AFA、 SFS Cavalcade North America、 Financial Intermediation Research Society等国际学术会议上所展示。

内容提要：

Despite the prevalent use of divestitures as merger remedies in the banking industry, academic research investigating divestitures is limited. This paper studies how bank divestitures in M&As affect the credit market. We exploit a difference-in-differences strategy and find that the combined market shares of the merging banks in the mortgage market decline following divestitures in M&A. This decline is less in mortgages to black borrowers and refinance mortgages, which rely more on relationship lending. In contrast, the combined market shares of the merging banks in local small business lending markets (which heavily rely on relationship lending) do not change, ruling out the possibility that the changes in local lending are driven by unobserved local economic fundamentals and suggesting that divestitures fail to maintain competitiveness in small business lending markets. Divestitures maintain competitiveness in the mortgage market but incur the following negative externalities: racial discrimination in the mortgage market in M&A counties is more severe than that in adjacent non-M&A counties after M&As; mortgages originated after M&As in M&A counties are more likely to enter foreclosure than those in adjacent non-M&A counties; and the housing prices in M&A counties also declined more dramatically during the subprime crisis. We use a difference-in-discontinuity strategy to show the causality between antitrust divestitures and changes in mortgage lending.

尽管资产剥离在银行业中作为一种合并补救手段被广泛使用，对其的学术研究却非常缺乏。本文研究了银行合并中资产剥离如何对信贷市场产生影响。我们通过采用 difference-in-differences的方法，发现在资产剥离后，按揭市场中银行的合并市场份额发生下降。这一下降在更依赖关系贷款的对黑人借款人的按揭和抵押贷款再融资中程度较低。相比而言，在非常依赖关系贷款的针对本地小企业的信贷市场中，银行的合并市场份额没有发生变化。这排除了是无法观测的本地经济基本面造成对本地贷款下降的可能性，并且显示资产剥离无法保持小企业信贷市场的竞争性。资产剥离可以保持按揭市场的竞争性，但是却会产生如下负外部性：相对相邻没有发生银行合并的县，按揭市场中的族群歧视在发生了银行合并的县更加严重；银行合并后发生的按揭贷款更可能发生抵押品赎回权被取消；发生银行合并的县的房价在次贷危机中的跌幅也更大。我们通过 difference-in-discontinuity的方法显示了反托拉斯资产剥离与按揭贷款所发生的变化二者之间的因果关系。