光华讲坛——社会名流与企业家论坛第5628期

主题： Dealing with Ethical Dilemmas: A Look at Financial Reporting by Firms Facing Product Harm Crises处理道德困境：面临产品危害危机的企业财务报告

主讲人：南京大学 张沙夫助理教授

主持人：西南财经大学经济与管理研究院  廖林副教授

时间：2019年11月26日（周二）上午10:00—11:30

地点：西南财经大学柳林校区格致楼1211

主办单位：经济与管理研究院  科研处

主讲人简介：

Dr. Shafu Zhang joined the Nanjing University Business School as assistant professor in 2018. He graduated from Concordia University in Canada in 2018with a doctorate in accounting (A joint PhD program offered by Concordia, HEC Montreal, and Mcgill University). His research interests include supply chain, information disclosure quality, and corporate governance. His research was previously exhibited at EAA, CAAA Conferences abroad, and at several Universities such as Monash University, Melbourne University, and LSE.

张沙夫博士, 南京大学助理教授。他于2018年毕业于加拿大康科迪亚大学，获得会计学博士学位（康科迪亚，蒙特利尔高等商学院和麦吉尔大学提供的联合博士培养）。他的研究兴趣包括供应链，信息披露质量和公司治理。他的研究以前曾在EAA，国外CAAA会议以及莫纳什大学，墨尔本大学和伦敦政治经济学院等几所大学中展出。

内容提要：

A product harm crisis (PHC) undermines a firm’s reputation as well as its managers’ career outlook. To shake off the stigmatization resulting from the PHC and regain a firm’s legitimacy among stakeholders, managers usually face an ethical dilemma as they choose to be transparent about the crisis’ financial implications or to obfuscate them to neutralize the negative impact of the PHC. We find evidence that managers engage in income-increasing earnings management when their firms experience PHCs. Moreover, while income-increasing earnings management in PHCs reduces the likelihood of customer loss and CEO forced turnover in the short run, such behavior can be deemed opportunistic and unethical as it carries long-run negative consequences in terms of a higher likelihood of accounting restatement and weaker future operating performance. Finally, managers in firms that are subject to stricter external monitoring and managers in firms with proactive ethical policies are less likely to engage in upward earnings management in PHCs.

产品损害危机 （PHC） 会损害公司的声誉以及管理者的职业前景。为了摆脱 PHC 造成的声誉受损，并在利益相关者中重新获得公司的合法性，管理者通常面临道德困境，因为他们可以选择危机的财务影响透明，或混淆视听以消除PHC 的负面影响。我们发现有证据表明，当经理的公司经历 PHC 时，他们从事增加收入的盈余管理。此外，虽然 PHC 中增加收入的盈余管理降低了客户损失的可能性，而且降低了 CEO 在短期内被迫离职，但这种行为可能被视为机会主义和不道德行为，因为它在以后会计重报的可能性较高，企业的未来运营绩效较弱。最后，受到更严格外部监督的公司的经理和具有积极道德政策的公司的经理不太可能在 PHC 中从事增加收入的盈余管理。